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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jose Ibarra appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of felony domestic battery, claiming the district court 
erred in allowing the admission of expert testimony on the subject of domestic 
violence. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
On October 31, 2012, Amber had plans to take two of her children trick-or-
treating with her estranged husband, Ibarra, from whom she was separated at 
that time. (Trial Tr., p.173, L.22 - p.174, L.22, p.175, Ls.10-15.) When Amber 
failed to arrive on time to meet Ibarra, he called her, angry, wanting to know 
where she was. (Trial Tr., p.175, L.18 - p.176, L.9.) Ibarra told Amber his car 
was broken down and instructed her to meet him at Winco, which she agreed to 
do. (Trial Tr., p.176, Ls.14-22.) 
When Amber arrived at Winco, Ibarra got into her van with her. (Trial Tr., 
p.177, Ls.12-20.) Ibarra began arguing with Amber inside the van in the 
presence of their two children and one of Amber's other children. (Trial Tr., 
p.174, Ls.13-16, p.177, Ls.8-11.) Ibarra was angry because Amber had been 
trick-or-treating with her older son's father and Ibarra was jealous. (Trial Tr., 
p.178, Ls.6-11.) Ibarra told Amber's older son to tell his dad to "F off' and 
threatened the boy's father's life if he ever saw him again. (Trial Tr., p.178, L.21 
- p.179, L.9.) 
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At one point, Ibarra told Amber to get out of the car because he wanted to 
"check to see if [she] had been cheating." (Trial Tr., p.179, Ls.10-25.) Ibarra did 
this by sticking his hand down Amber's pants. (Trial Tr., p.180, Ls.6-7.) Ibarra 
also wanted Amber's cell phone, which she eventually gave to him. (Trial Tr., 
p.177, Ls.24-25, p.181, Ls.6-8.) After getting Amber's phone, Ibarra made a call, 
then put the phone in his pocket and refused to give it back to Amber despite her 
pleas. (Trial Tr., p.181, L.9 - p.182, L.3.) Ibarra then got in his car. (Trial Tr., 
p.182, Ls.15-17.) 
When Ibarra got in his car, Amber stuck her arm in the window to try and 
unlock the door so she could get her phone back. (Trial Tr., p.182, Ls.15-22.) 
Ibarra rolled up the window, trapping Amber's arm, and drove off. (Trial Tr., 
p.182, Ls.22-23.) Amber was able to free her arm after running alongside 
lbarra's moving car for several feet. (Trial Tr., p.183, L.23 - p.184, L.3; Exhibit 
5.) The incident resulted in severe bruising to Amber's arm. (Exhibits 1-4.) 
The state charged Ibarra with felony domestic battery and misdemeanor 
domestic battery. (R., pp.10-11, 25-26.) Prior to trial, the state filed a 
"Disclosure of Expert Witnesses" in the area of domestic violence. (R., pp.61-
62.) Specifically, the state sought to introduce testimony regarding "the 
dynamics of domestic violence, the effects of domestic violence, common 
characteristics of domestic violence, why victims often recant, dynamics of and 
causes for recanting, and other common characteristics relevant to these facts." 
(R., p.62.) Ibarra objected, arguing the "State's proposed expert has no 
knowledge of the facts of this case, has not interviewed either the Defendant or 
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the alleged victim, and has no knowledge of whether a domestic violence 
incident ever occurred" and, therefore, he claimed, the testimony was not 
relevant. (R., pp.64-65.) Ibarra further argued that the state's "request is that it 
wishes to have its expert assist the jury in evaluating the victim's credibility," 
which is the jury's role, and that the state was "attempting to dress up common 
human emotions and motives into something that is only understandable by 
'experts."' (R., p.64.) Finally, Ibarra argued the proposed expert testimony would 
"cause unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and/or mislead the jury." (R., 
p.65.) 
The court conducted a hearing on the admissibility of the state's proffered 
expert testimony and ruled: 
Until I hear the witness's qualifications and the actual 
opinions that are being offered by the state, I don't know that I'm in 
a position to exercise [my] discretion. I do believe that expert 
testimony in this area, providing appropriate foundation is laid, is 
probably admissible. I don't think it is in the same nature as speed 
or whether somebody is under the influence of alcohol or drunk or 
some of the things that are generally recognized as lay opinion. 
I do think that somebody that has worked with domestic 
violence victims for a significant period of time and studied them 
probably is in a position to present help, information, and testimony 
that would be helpful to the jury. Of course that opinion would be 
subject to vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and clear instruction on the burden of proof and 
everything, and then the jury could put whatever weight, if any, they 
feel to put on that testimony just like any other testimony. 
So provided the appropriate foundation is laid, the court is 
inclined and probably would admit such testimony .... 
(3/14/2013 Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.19.) 
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Consistent with the court's pre-trial ruling, Dr. Lisa Bostaph testified at trial 
regarding the characteristics of domestic violence, including why domestic 
violence victims sometimes recant. (See generally Trial Tr., pp.235-246.) The 
jury found Ibarra guilty of felony domestic battery but acquitted him of the 
misdemeanor charge. (R., pp.140-141.) The court imposed a unified 10-year 
sentence with two and one-half years fixed and denied lbarra's request for Rule 
35 relief. (R., pp.159-160, 184-192.) Ibarra filed a timely appeal from the 
judgment. (R., pp.161-164.) 
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ISSUE 
Ibarra states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing the State to 
present expert testimony on the subject of domestic violence? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Parton failed to establish error in the admission of Dr. Lisa Bostaph's 
testimony about the characteristics of domestic violence, including the reasons 
domestic violence victims recant? 
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ARGUMENT 
Ibarra Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Allowing Dr. Bostaph To Testify, Based On Her Expertise Related To Domestic 
Violence, About The Characteristics Of Domestic Violence And The Reasons 
Victims Of Domestic Violence Recant 
A. Introduction 
Ibarra contends the district court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. 
Bostaph to testify "on the subject of domestic violence," arguing Dr. Bostaph's 
testimony was "not helpful to the jury" and, "[a)lternatively," "any limited relevance 
of Dr. Bostaph's testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.8.) Both of lbarra's arguments fail. The district court correctly concluded 
that Dr. Bostaph's testimony was admissible in this case. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The determination of whether expert testimony will assist the trier of fact 
lies within the broad discretion of the trial court." State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 
563, 300 P.3d 1046, 1051 (2013) (quoting Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, 
Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 252, 245 P.3d 992, 1004 (2010)). 
C. Ibarra Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Permitting Dr. Bostaph's Testimony 
"To be admissible, the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." State v. Joslin, 145 
Idaho 75, 81, 175 P.3d i64, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted); see also I.R.E. 702. 
"The function of the expert is to provide testimony on subjects that are beyond 
the common sense, experience and education of the average juror." State v. 
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Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 42, 966 P.2d 33, 42 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted). 
Only where the normal experience of the jurors permits them to draw proper 
conclusions from the facts and circumstances are expert conclusions or opinions 
inadmissible. kl Expert testimony "about the effects of domestic violence on 
victims" is admissible. See State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 855, 26 P.3d 31, 38 
(2001); see also Com. v. Goetzendanner, 679 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1997) (citations omitted) ("We conclude, as have courts in other jurisdictions, that 
the pattern of behavioral and emotional characteristics common to the victims of 
battering lies beyond the ken of the ordinary juror and may properly be the 
subject of expert testimony."). 
The district court concluded that expert testimony on domestic violence 
would be "helpful to the jury." (3/14/2013 Tr., p.11, Ls.7-11.) Ibarra argues this 
was error because there was no "evidence that the lbarras were involved in any 
type of on-going, violence infused relationship." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Thus, 
he concludes, Dr. Bostaph's testimony "was not helpful to jurors, who would be 
more than capable of determining whether Mr. Ibarra was guilty based upon 
[Amber's] testimony and impeachment thereof, and the other evidence 
presented." (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Although not entirely clear, this 
argument appears to be a restatement of lbarra's objection below that Dr. 
Bostaph's testimony was not relevant because she had no knowledge of whether 
the lbarras had a "domestic violence relationship." (R., p.65.) However, nothing 
in I.R.E. 702 requires an expert to have specific knowledge of the facts of the 
case in which the expert is testifying and it is not uncommon that an expert 
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testifies on a subject matter without reference to the specific facts of the case. 
See, sUL., State v. Dutt, 139 Idaho 99, 104, 73 P.3d 112, 117 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(expert testimony about "general progression of child sexual abuse through 
various phases, as well as the behavior and characteristics of victim and offender 
during the progression through those phases" without "link[ing] the general 
progression of child sexual abuse to the particular circumstances of the offenses 
with which Dutt was charged"). Nor does it matter, as Ibarra suggests, that there 
was no evidence of "any type of on-going violence infused relationship." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Ibarra certainly cites no authority for the proposition that 
expert testimony on the characteristics of domestic violence is only relevant and 
admissible where there is evidence of an "an on-going violence infused 
relationship." (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) For purposes of admissibility, the only 
question is whether the expert's opinion would "assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." I.R.E. 702. That 
standard was satisfied in this case. 
At the hearing on the state's motion to admit Dr. Bostaph's testimony, the 
state noted the testimony would include an explanation of "reasons why some 
victims may minimize or recant" and "why somebody has been at the hands of 
abuse by a defendant would come in and then state that it didn't happen or 
minimize it generally." (3/14/2013 Tr., p.8, L.22 - p.9, L.2.) Such an explanation 
was important in this case because Amber's testimony evolved by the time of trial 
and the evidence showed that this was a result of lbarra's efforts to control her -
a core characteristic of domestic violence. 
8 
The day after the domestic battery, Amber sought assistance from the 
Nampa Family Justice Center where she met with Officer Travis Woodbury. 
(Trial Tr., p.150, L.25 - p.151, L.14.) After speaking with Amber, Officer 
Woodbury believed that Ibarra battered Amber. (Trial Tr., p.151, L.21 - p.152, 
L.7.) Also at the Family Justice Center, Amber completed an application for a 
civil protection order. (Trial Tr., p.196, Ls.10-17.) In her application, Amber 
wrote that she was scared during the incident at Winco and that Ibarra 
threatened to kill all of them because he had "nothing to lose." (Trial Tr., p.195, 
L.25 - p.196, L.9.) Amber also indicated on her protection order application that 
Ibarra had, on a prior occasion, attempted to strangle her. (Trial Tr., p.270, L.22 
-p.271,L.1.) 
On November 20, 2012, approximately three weeks after the incident, 
Amber also testified at lbarra's preliminary hearing. At that hearing, Amber 
testified about her argument with Ibarra, including that he put his hand down her 
pants to check to see if she had had sex with someone else, took her cell phone, 
and threatened to kill her and her children. (P.H. Tr., p.7, L.17 - p.9, L.15.) 
Amber also described what happened when she put her arm in lbarra's car 
window in an effort to retrieve her cell phone, testifying: 
Then he turned the car on, went to take off and rolled my 
arm up in the window and then he took off and went around the 
corner a little bit and drug me, ran over my foot in the process and 
then I pulled my arm out .... 
(P.H. Tr., p.9, Ls.22-25.) 
By the time of trial, Amber modified her testimony, claiming she was 
"pretty sure" she consented to Ibarra putting his hand down her pants and that 
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she was scratching and hitting Ibarra when she put her arm in the car window, 
which Amber admitted she failed to mention to Officer Woodbury or include in her 
preliminary hearing testimony, claiming she did not do so because she did not 
want to get "in trouble" for "scratching and hitting" Ibarra. (Trial Tr., p.180, L.17-
p.181, L.1, p.184, Ls.10-23, p.191, L.3 - p.192, L.6.) Amber further testified at 
trial that the prosecutor was not "listening to what [she] had to say about 
everything," and that Ibarra was just "trying to get away from [her] attacking him." 
(Trial Tr., p.226, Ls.9-11, p.230, Ls.7-16.) Amber also claimed Ibarra is a good 
father, a good husband, and that she feels safe around him. (Trial Tr., p.226, 
L.19 - p.227, L.1.) By the time of trial, Amber claimed Ibarra did not batter her 
on October 31. (Trial Tr., p.268, Ls.11-13.) 
The characteristics of domestic violence, and particularly the dynamics of 
power and control, as described by Dr. Bostaph (Trial Tr., p.238, L.20 - p.239, 
L.4), were helpful to the jury to understand why Amber's version of what 
happened changed by the time of trial. This is particularly true where, as here, 
there was evidence that Ibarra attempted, and in fact did, exert control over 
Amber's testimony. Ibarra called Amber 30 times after the incident. (Trial Tr., 
p.197, Ls.13-20.) Portions of three of those calls were admitted at trial. (Exhibit 
6.) During those calls, Ibarra encourages Amber not to testify, to write a 
statement for his attorney, and advises her that "they" cannot force her to testify. 
(Exhibit 6.) In one call, Ibarra says: 
Doesn't fuckin matter, dude. Doesn't fuckin matter. If you don't 
want me out, then don't get me out, dude. Plain and simple. I'll 
fuckin' hate you for the rest of my life though. Know what I'm 
sayin? I'm trying to move forward from this, from all this shit and I 
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wanted to call you and fuckin apologize to your ass but if you don't 
want to fuckin take my apologies and wanna still say something 
happened, then do it. 
(Exhibit 6, Track 3.) 
Amber relented to lbarra's intimidation, which is not only illustrated by her 
trial testimony, but also by emails she sent to lbarra's attorney (as Ibarra 
instructed her to do), claiming that when she was "in court at the prelim and on 
the paperwork [she] filled out for the protection order," she "left out" that she had 
been "hitting and scratching" Ibarra when she put her hand in the car window. 
(R., p.85.) Indeed, Ibarra moved to dismiss the case based on Amber's emails. 
(R., pp.83-88.) 
Based on the circumstances of the case, Dr. Bostaph's testimony was 
admissible because it assisted the trier of the fact in understanding the evidence 
and determining a fact in issue - namely, why Amber modified her version of 
events and minimized her fear and lbarra's culpability. lbarra's claim that the 
testimony was improper absent evidence of an "on-going, violence infused 
relationship" is without merit. 
Ibarra alternatively argues that, even if "Dr. Bostaph's testimony was 
helpful to the jury in some way," the testimony as "substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Specifically, Ibarra complains there 
was a "danger that the jury would consider Dr. Bostaph's testimony as describing 
the lbarras' actual relationship, and that they would render a verdict based, not 
upon the evidence actually presented, but upon the presumption that [he] is a 
'batterer' and he must be guilty" or "presume" that Ibarra "would commit violent 
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acts against [Amber] in the future." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) This argument is 
belied by the fact that Dr. Bostaph testified she knew nothing about the facts of 
the case and had "no idea" whether any of her testimony applied to them. (Trial 
Tr., p.237, L.19 - p.238, L.3, p.247, L.7 - p.248, L.5.) lbarra's argument also 
presupposes the jury failed to follow the instructions that required them to find the 
elements of the charged offenses, beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to find 
Ibarra guilty. (R., pp.111, 124, 125.) The legal presumption is, however, exactly 
the opposite - jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions. State v. 
Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, _, 313 P.3d 1, 25 (2013). Finally, lbarra's argument is 
undermined by the fact that the jury acquitted him of one of the charges. If, as 
Ibarra claims, Dr. Bostaph's testimony would have caused the jury to convict him 
on the assumption he is a "batterer," the jury would have convicted him of both 
charges. lbarra's claim that Dr. Bostaph's testimony was inadmissible because it 
was unfairly prejudicial fails. 
D. Even If This Court Concludes Ibarra Has Met His Burden Of Showing 
Evidentiary Error, Any Such Error Is Harmless 
Even if the court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Bostaph to testify, 
which it did not, any error was harmless. Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that 
"[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52. "The inquiry is whether, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even 
without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 
664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
12 
24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)); see also State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
Even under her revised version of events, Amber testified that Ibarra rolled 
up the window of his car while her arm was in it and drove away and Amber 
clearly suffered injuries as a result. (Trial Tr., p.182, Ls.17-23.) Amber's 
testimony was corroborated by the Winco surveillance footage. (Exhibit 5.) 
Regardless of whether Amber hit or scratched Ibarra while she had her arm in 
the car, lbarra's actions constituted felony domestic battery. 1 (See R., p.124 
(elements instruction).) Beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have 
convicted Ibarra of felony domestic battery without Dr. Bostaph's testimony. 
Application of the legal standards relevant to the admission of expert 
testimony to the facts of this case shows the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting Dr. Bostaph's testimony. Ibarra has failed to show 
otherwise. Even if Ibarra has met his burden of showing error, any error was 
harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm lbarra's conviction for 
felony domestic battery. 
DATED this 24th day of April, 2014. 
CA M. LORELLO 
De ty Attorney General 
1 Notably, Ibarra did not request a self-defense or mutual combat instruction. 
(See Trial Tr., p.274, L.19 - p.278, L.15.) 
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